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Since the Delaware Chancery Court handed down its famous footnote in Credit
Lyonnais some 14 years ago, attorneys have been counseling the directors and officers of
corporate clients on how to fulfill their fiduciary duties in the amorphous “vicinity of
insolvency.” We advise directors and officers on how to broaden their perspective
beyond the shareholder-centric corporate paradigm and to avoid decisions taken (or not
taken) which might adversely affect the so-called “corporate enterprise.” Forests surely
have been decimated to produce innumerable memoranda for these clients, citing
footnote 55 in Credit Lyonnais and providing a detailed series of “do’s” and “don’ts,” in
an effort to keep our clients out of trouble. Focus has been put on generally applicable
principles like the business judgment rule, implementing appropriate board review
processes and securing fairness opinions. The end result (we hope) is that, based on our
legal advice, our clients become better equipped to navigate their way through financings,
strategic transactions, foreclosures, dissolutions or even bankruptcy.
A question we sometimes get from clients, however, is this: “When has a court
actually found a director or officer liable for one of these vicinity of insolvency claims?”
Reading between the lines, the client may be asking exactly how egregious a director or
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officer’s conduct would have to be to be found liable under Credit Lyonnais’ vicinity of
insolvency standard.
The question is a good one. Who actually wins these cases when they go to trial,
and how often do such trials occur? The answer may surprise you. In the 14 years since
the Credit Lyonnais ruling, there have been literally only a few cases involving Credit
Lyonnais vicinity of insolvency claims that actually have gone to trial and been decided
on the merits.1 According to Westlaw.com, there have been approximately 32 decisions
applying (or at least discussing) the shifting of directors’ and officers’ duties in the
vicinity of insolvency. Of those cases, only three appear to have gone to trial and were
fully adjudicated on the merits. The remaining cases appear to have been disposed of
through motions to dismiss, motions on the pleadings or summary judgments.
What does this dearth of caselaw mean? Ideally, perhaps it means that attorneys
are counseling corporate clients effectively, and, as a result, there simply are few
breaches of fiduciary duty to be litigated. More realistically, however, it means that the
majority of such cases that are filed settle before trial, just as with the vast majority of
other civil litigation. The impetus to settle these cases also is fueled by the fact that in the
typical action against a director or officer alleging breach of her “shifted” fiduciary duties
in the vicinity of insolvency, a directors and officers liability insurance policy (“D&O
insurance”) provides coverage for the underlying alleged wrongful acts of the director or
officer. After some discovery and motion practice, the D&O insurance carrier typically
will authorize a settlement. Money is paid out and claims are dismissed. In sum, while it
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We selected Credit Lyonnais for this survey because it is one of the seminal cases on the duties of a
director or officer in the vicinity of insolvency under Delaware law – the law applicable to most of
our corporate clients. There are, of course, other lines of cases from other jurisdictions that also may
address this type of fiduciary duty.
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is fair to say that litigation frequently may be commenced against directors and officers
alleging breach of Credit Lyonnais duties, an eventual monetary settlement is just too
attractive to pass up, and the case, for better or worse, dies on the vine. Since the terms
of such settlements are not publicly reported, we thus have little data to analyze in order
to assess the true cost of cases alleging breaches of such duties.
Our client’s original question, however, must still be answered: When has a court
really found a director or officer liable for a vicinity of insolvency claim? A review of
the few court decisions available is quite instructive and does, in fact, provide some
meaningful guidance to the client and attorney alike. Of the few reported decisions,
Odyssey highlights some of the time-tested principles we advocate: involvement of
counsel, a board which actively considers all available options and the structuring of a
transaction that is as fair as possible to the corporation’s stakeholders. A second case, In
re Schultz, highlights the risk of “freezing out” outside directors on a board of directors.
Finally, the third case, In re Flutie, presents the type of fact pattern which might lead an
observer to wonder how the defendant (the debtor’s principal) ever believed he could
evade a vicinity of insolvency claim.
Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 735 A.2d 386 (Del. Ch. 1999)
Odyssey may not necessarily represent the classic paradigm of well-advised
directors and officers successfully navigating through the vicinity of insolvency.
Nevertheless, the case has several positive points about how directors can utilize the
advice of counsel, the board process and their board’s industry experience to ultimately
defeat a Credit Lyonnais claim.
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Relevant Facts
The various transactions at issue here are somewhat difficult to explain in a
summary manner. At bottom, the litigation arose out of a foreclosure sale at which
defendant Fleming Co., Inc. (“Fleming”) acquired 100% of the stock of ABCO Markets
Inc. (“ABCO Markets”), the operating subsidiary of ABCO Holding, Inc. (“ABCO”). At
the time of the sale, Fleming was both the majority shareholder and sole secured creditor
of ABCO, that debt being secured by a pledge of essentially all ABCO’s assets, including
the ABCO Markets stock. While several parties appeared at the foreclosure sale,
Fleming made the only bid, equal to the value of the debt foreclosed. As part of the
transaction, Fleming undertook to pay all of ABCO’s unsecured creditors in full. After
these transactions, ABCO was left as a shell corporation without material assets,
liabilities or operations, and its common stock was valueless.
The plaintiffs, Odyssey Partners L.P. (“Odyssey Partners”) and certain other
parties who were minority shareholders of ABCO, were predictably unhappy with the
results of the transactions and subsequently sued Fleming in the Delaware Chancery
Court. The plaintiffs alleged various breaches of fiduciary duties, including vicinity of
insolvency duties, by Fleming and four former members of ABCO’s board of directors.
As damages, Plaintiffs sought recovery of the value of their ABCO shares at the time of
the foreclosure sales, which they claimed to have been approximately $6.1 million.
As is relevant to the litigation, in 1988 ABCO purchased a series of grocery
stores, relying in part on debt financing from Fleming. In 1991, with the supermarket
business becoming a tougher industry in which to turn a profit, ABCO restructured its
capital structure with an eye to off-loading some of the debt that was threatening to
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cripple the company. The restructuring involved Fleming extending trade credit to
ABCO, the exchange of debt for ABCO preferred stock, execution of a shareholders’
agreement allowing Fleming to fill two board seats and ABCO granting a junior lien to
Fleming on ABCO’s assets. A second restructuring of ABCO’s capital structure
occurred in 1992. Odyssey Partners, although it participated in the 1992 restructuring,
decided not to invest in the restructuring, instead leaving it to Fleming to once again loan
much-needed capital to ABCO. The 1992 restructuring also resulted in the creation of
ABCO Holdings, modification of existing supply agreements between Fleming and
ABCO and the renegotiation of certain shareholder agreement. All parties to the 1992
restructuring understood that as a result of Fleming stepping up to the plate once again,
Fleming would become ABCO’s largest shareholder, its largest supplier and one of its
two secured creditors.
Despite these restructurings, ABCO continued to struggle financially and in 1994,
it defaulted on its senior secured credit facility. Shortly thereafter, ABCO began a search
for yet more capital, hiring successive investment bankers to develop proposals that
would make the company liquid once more. Ultimately, no silver bullet was found. In
September 1995, ABCO defaulted on both its senior and junior secured debt. Fleming
once again stepped into the breach, granting a $5 million extension on ABCO’s
outstanding trade payables. ABCO’s default on its debt obligations also caused a default
under the supply and credit agreement it had with Fleming. This in turn allowed Fleming
to exercise warrants that gave it ownership of a majority of ABCO’s outstanding shares.
At the same time, one of the Fleming-appointed directors approached other board
members and informed them that Fleming was considering various recapitalization
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options, including purchase of the now-defaulted senior debt. The reaction was summed
up by one board member: “[h]urray, we are finally getting some capital into the
company.” Odyssey Partners, 735 A.2d at 395. However, in the months that followed
and as the details of Fleming’s plan were made known, it became evident that Fleming’s
recapitalization proposals were not being greeted with such enthusiasm by all of the
ABCO directors or minority shareholders. Fleming ultimately purchased the senior debt,
exercised its warrants to take ownership to 50.1% of the company and foreclosed on
ABCO’s assets. At the foreclosure sale, Fleming, acting through counsel, offered $66
million, representing the indebtedness being foreclosed. Thereafter, all creditors, secured
and unsecured, were paid in full. The owners of ABCO equity, including plaintiffs,
received nothing.
In their lawsuit, plaintiffs specifically attacked the defendant directors, claiming
that they acted disloyally and in bad faith in favoring Fleming’s interests over those of
ABCO or its minority shareholders. Plaintiffs focused, in particular, on the directors’
approval of Fleming’s purchase of the senior debt, their acquiescence in the ensuing
foreclosure and their failure to consider alternatives to foreclosure, including chapter 11
bankruptcy protection. The court found that such assertions were unsupported at trial and
ultimately entered judgment for all defendants. In its decision, the court found that while
ABCO was clearly insolvent at the time of challenged transactions (given the serial
defaults on the senior and junior debt obligations), the defendant directors fully
discharged their duties to creditors.
Court’s Holding
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For our purposes, what factors or evidence did the court consider in finding that
the defendant directors had met their Credit Lyonnais duties? Importantly, the court
began its analysis by noting that when the ABCO board met for the last time prior to
Fleming’s foreclosure sale, the company’s counsel specifically advised the directors of
the changed nature of their fiduciary duties in light of ABCO’ insolvency, i.e., their duty
to take into consideration the interests of creditors as well as those of shareholders in
determining whether or not to approve Fleming’s acquisition of the senior debt for the
purpose of foreclosing on it. The court opined that most of the directors perceived
(correctly) that ABCO’s debt load was greater than the fair market value of its assets and
that there were, as a practical matter, no viable alternatives to the threatened foreclosure.
The court noted that in response to one of the director’s concerns that ABCO would not
be able to meet its unsecured obligations pending the foreclosure sale, one of the Fleming
directors stated that, conditioned on the agreement of the directors to proceed with the
foreclosure sale, Fleming would undertake to pay all of ABCO’s unsecured debt
obligations, regardless of the outcome of the foreclosure sale. The court found that
Fleming had indeed advanced ABCO sufficient funds in order to pay ABCO’s unsecured
creditors (thus avoiding the very harm of which the plaintiffs were complaining.) The
court found that this concession by Fleming protected the interests of ABCO’s general
creditors, while also protecting the interests of the shareholders (including the plaintiffs)
and the corporate enterprise by providing a mechanism to keep ABCO supplied and
operating during the interim period leading up to the foreclosure sale. With this
concession in hand, the directors voted to approve the sale of the senior debt to Fleming
by a vote of 5 to 1.
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Addressing the plaintiffs’ contention that the ABCO board’s failure to undertake a
substantive discussion of the pros and cons of ABCO filing for chapter 11 evidenced the
defendants’ disloyalty or lack of good faith, the court found that the directors had spoken
informally about the bankruptcy option in the weeks prior to the November 20, 1995
board meeting. The court also found that the directors had included counsel (including
bankruptcy counsel) in several discussions concerning options to foreclosure, and
deferred to the directors’ experience that retail grocery bankruptcies amounted to nothing
more than liquidation sales.
Applying Credit Lyonnais, the court found that the board was obligated to
consider and protect interests other than those of the shareholders. According to the
court, when bankruptcy and foreclosure were compared -- and the effects of both on the
shareholders, creditors and other corporate constituencies balanced -- the decision to
proceed with the foreclosure could not have been said to have been made in bad faith or
in a manner that was disloyal to ABCO. On the other hand, the court found that at least
the majority of directors reasonably believed that a bankruptcy filing would produce
negative returns for all of the ABCO constituencies, including its shareholders.
In re Shultz, 208 B.R. 723 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997)
Schultz can best be thought of as a cautionary tale about family-run corporations,
the risk of freezing out outside directors and the need to have someone (yes, the very
same outside directors) take a stand against transactions that serve to benefit only the
family and leave the corporate enterprise insolvent and its creditors “holding the bag.”
Relevant Facts
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The defendant Arthur Schultz (“Schultz”) and members of his family were
directors of Miramar Resources, Inc. (“Miramar”), a NASDAQ traded company which
operated gas and oil wells in Colorado.2 Miramar had an eight-person board of directors,
including five members of the Shultz family and three non-Shultz family outside
directors. In July 1991, Miramar retained an investment banking firm, Whitehall
Company, Ltd. (“Whitehall”), concerning a possible sale of the Schultz family’s interest
in Miramar. As a separate engagement, Whitehall also was retained by a group of
entities known as the Dominion Group (“Dominion”) to locate publicly-traded companies
where the management of the company was willing to relinquish control. Whitehall
brought the Shultz family and Dominion together. Whitehall brokered the sale of the
control of Miramar, and Dominion agreed to pay the Shultz family $1 million for that
control. Schultz’s father, also a Miramar director, contacted the outside directors of
Miramar and requested that they execute a document authorizing Miramar to enter into a
series of transactions, including a sale of Miramar stock to Dominion for $1 million.
Schultz resigned from the board on July 17, 2001. The various board resolutions
relating to the Shultz family’s exit from Miramar were subsequently discussed at a board
of directors’ meeting in late July. Although Schultz had resigned, he nevertheless
attended the meeting. The outside directors (who had never even heard of Dominion)
objected to the resolutions and insisted that they be provided a due diligence package on
the transaction and that a fairness opinion on the value of Miramar be rendered before
they would approve the transaction. A second board of directors’ meeting was held three
2

Certain facts have been taken from the bankruptcy court’s Findings of Fact entered in the adversary
proceeding commenced by Miramar in its chapter 11 case against Schultz and others. The adversary
proceeding is styled Miramar Resources, Inc. v. Dominion Investment Limited et al. (In re Miramar
Resources, Inc.), Chapter 11 Case No. 91-24033-DEC, Adv. No. 92-2263-SBB (D. Colo. Oct. 13,
1993).
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days later. Despite the outside directors’ “line in the sand” drawn at the first meeting
concerning the request for due diligence and a fairness opinion, no diligence was
provided and no fairness opinion was ever rendered. Nevertheless, the board approved
the various transactions, with the Schultz family directors voting yes and the outside
directors voting no. Schultz did not attend this meeting.
In October 1991, Miramar filed for bankruptcy protection in the District of
Colorado. Thereafter, an adversary proceeding was brought by Miramar against Schultz
and other defendants, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty. No defendants appeared to
defend that action and the bankruptcy court subsequently entered judgment on behalf of
Miramar against the defendants in the amount of $1,051,404. In its ruling, the
bankruptcy court concluded that the various breaches of fiduciary duty by the Schultz
family directors went well beyond a simple failure to abide by customary business
practices. Rather, the court found that the transactions were approved without any
consideration as to whether they were fair to the company or its shareholders. Although
not specifically applying a Credit Lyonnais type analysis to the facts, the court
determined that the Schultz family directors engaged in a “bizarre” series of transactions
with the overriding purpose being their own personal enrichment.
We also find it interesting that in its findings of fact (which were subsequently
adopted by the Schultz court), the Miramar court found that the July 20 and 23 board
minutes, prepared by the company’s outside counsel, did not accurately reflect the
resolutions passed at either of those meetings. Likewise, the court found that the form 8K filed by Miramar relating to the transaction did not accurately reflect the discussions or
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decisions made at the July board meetings and that the outside directors were not
consulted in the 8-K’s preparation and never received a copy of it.
Schultz filed his own chapter 7 case on February 16, 1996 in bankruptcy court in
Florida. Through bankruptcy, he sought to discharge various debts, including the
bankruptcy court judgment in favor of Miramar. Miramar objected to the discharge and a
bankruptcy court trial was held. At trial, Miramar asserted that Schultz should be
considered a “trustee” of Miramar pursuant to the Delaware Trust Fund doctrine and the
duties imposed by Credit Lyonnais on directors of companies on the brink of insolvency.
Miramar asserted that given such circumstances, discharge of the Miramar judgment
under § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code was inappropriate.
Court’s Holding
The court began its analysis by making the common-sense observation that
Miramar was solvent at the time of the July 2001 transactions in question. However, as
the court noted, the standard is whether a corporation is in the ‘vicinity of insolvency’
(the court actually uses the term “brink,”) and found that Schultz was aware that the
contemplated transactions would have rendered Miramar insolvent once they were
consummated. The court therefore concluded that Schultz knew that Miramar was on the
“brink of insolvency” just prior to the transactions. Applying a Credit Lyonnais analysis,
the court found that Schultz, although not technically still a Miramar director,
nevertheless had a duty to act in the best interests of the company. The court concluded
that he failed in that duty. The court observed that Schultz was, at the very least, aware
of the actions of the board of directors. Although he did not take an active role as a
director in Miramar, Schultz nonetheless was present when certain decisions were made
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that ultimately adversely affected the corporation. Further, Schultz personally stood to
profit from the transactions and knew that the outside directors originally had objected to
the transactions without due diligence materials or a fairness opinion. In light of these
facts, the court found that Schultz had further duties to act in the best interest of the other
directors and shareholders in relation to the money received from Dominion. Indeed, one
of the outside directors specifically testified at trial that he recalled Schultz asking if
obtaining the fairness opinion would cause a delay in the transactions. Regardless of his
motivations, however, Schultz failed to ensure that the outside directors received
appropriate information concerning the transactions, the requested fairness opinion was
obtained or the proceeds from the sale of the company were distributed properly (i.e., to
more than just family members).
In re Flutie N.Y. Corp., 310 B.R. 31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004)
Flutie is most instructive as a “what not to do” case. As discussed below, the
debtor’s principal (and his father) were found personally liable for a series of fraudulent
transactions and ordered to pay back some $1.8 million. This case is most notable for the
basic failure on the part of the debtor and its principals to observe the barest of corporate
formalities, keep proper records or in fact understand the difference between “personal”
and “corporate” expenses.
Relevant Facts
Flutie New York Corp. d/b/a Company Management (“Flutie N.Y.” or the
“Debtor”) was in the business of representing fashion models. Flutie N.Y.’s principal
was Michael Flutie (“Flutie”) and his father Albert Flutie was president and 100%
shareholder. Flutie N.Y. was not Flutie’s first foray into the world of fashion models (or
indeed bankruptcy court.) In 1990, Flutie created MFME Management Company
12

(“MFME”), another model management company. MFME used “Company
Management” as its d/b/a. MFME in turn licensed the use of “Company Management”
to the newly-formed Flutie N.Y. and transferred the assets of MFME to Flutie N.Y. In
1997, MFME filed for bankruptcy protection. Flutie N.Y. carried on substantially the
same business as MFME and Flutie continued to represent substantially the same models
he had with MFME. Nor was Flutie content with just running Flutie N.Y. In 1999,
Flutie formed Flutie Media, which started as a public relations business for other
companies, as well as for the Flutie N.Y. models. In 2001, Flutie began winding down
the operations of Flutie N.Y. and transferred its remaining assets to Flutie Media,
including use of the name “Company Management.” As a result of the closure of the
Flutie N.Y. business, Flutie Media and Flutie began to represent models formerly
represented by Flutie N.Y., as well as its former public relations clients.
Apparently seized by the entrepreneurial bug again, in early 2002, Flutie began to
operate his modeling company under a new corporate entity, Victoria Suns — which also
happened to do business as Company Management. Beginning in mid-2003, and while
continuing to operate Victoria Suns, Flutie apparently switched business plans again,
deciding to manage only the individual models and not work on individual jobs or on
invoicing. As part of this transition, Flutie advised the models on agencies who could
handle their work and accompanied the models to meetings with agencies who would
take over their representation. Flutie continued to earn commissions on their work while
acting as their personal manager.
Flutie N.Y. filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy protection in August 21, 2002 and a
chapter 7 trustee subsequently was appointed. To no one’s great surprise (except perhaps
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Flutie’s), the chapter 7 trustee for Flutie N.Y. shortly thereafter filed an adversary
proceeding against Flutie, his father, and certain related entities, seeking to hold the
defendants liable for the debts of the estate and seeking the return of funds transferred to
the defendants by Flutie N.Y. After a three-day trial, the bankruptcy court found Flutie
and his father personally liable for the debts of Flutie N.Y., concluding:
Michael Flutie, as the controlling and dominant figure in the operation of Flutie
N.Y., notwithstanding the figurehead position of his father as president, breached
his fiduciary duties to Flutie N.Y. when he permitted and actively orchestrated the
transfer of assets from Flutie N.Y. Michael Flutie stripped the assets of the
Debtor, with the concurrence of his father. Debtor’s estate has been rendered
insolvent, as a direct result of the looting, domination and control of the Debtor by
Michael Flutie and his fraudulent transfers of the Debtors assets to himself, to
members of his immediate family, to other persons or corporations controlled or
dominated by Michael Flutie.
In re Flutie N.Y. Corp., 310 B.R. at 58.
Court’s Holding
What did the bankruptcy court focus on in reaching its determination specifically
that Flutie and his father breached their Credit Lyonnais “vicinity of insolvency” duties to
the corporate enterprise? As a threshold matter, the court credited testimony from the
trustee’s accountant that Flutie N.Y. was insolvent almost since its inception in 1995 and
remained in the vicinity of insolvency through the date of its bankruptcy petition. The
court further found that Flutie N.Y. had valid, binding model contracts and that Flutie
was responsible for procuring the breach of those contracts (and thereby destroying the
financial well-being of Flutie N.Y.) by having the models work for related Flutie entities
and other modeling agencies.
Flutie certainly did not help his case by failing to observe any corporate
formalities between his various business entities. The court specifically found that the
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corporate forms Flutie used were solely designed to promote Flutie’s own modeling
management business, and that the transition of his business from entity to entity was
done with complete disregard for corporate formalities. Somewhat incredibly, based on
the evidence presented at trial, there appeared to have been no board of directors’
meetings, no board votes, and stock certificates were never issued for any of the
corporate entities.
Nor was Flutie’s case helped by his apparent inability to provide any
documentation to support the transfers challenged by the chapter 7 trustee. During the
trial, the trustee presented Flutie N.Y.’s general ledger as Exhibit A of its practice of
paying Flutie’s (and certain of his father’s) personal expenses, including rent, car lease
payments, utility bills and payments for Flutie N.Y.’s American Express corporate card.
While the Amex card was intended for corporate expenses, it was apparent that Flutie had
used it for personal expenses. The evidence presented showed that Flutie charged
gasoline, hardware and lumber for his house in the Hamptons, a bicycle, groceries, movie
tickets, drug store items, liquor and lift tickets for a ski trip to Aspen. As the court noted,
some of these charges may indeed have been for legitimate expenses, but Flutie had
“utterly failed to present any credible evidence that these charges were anything other
than Michael Flutie’s use of the Flutie N.Y. corporate form to enjoy a standard of living
that he could not personally afford -- ultimately, Flutie N.Y. could not afford it either.”
In re Flutie N.Y. Corp., 310 B.R. at 53.
For his defense, Flutie in part argued unsuccessfully that he had never received a
salary from Flutie N.Y., instead relying on loans from the company in lieu of salary, and
Flutie N.Y. received compensation in the form of his services. With the exception of the

15

general ledger itself, there was no documentation provided for any of the purported loans
and the court rejected Flutie’s contentions out of hand.
***
Lessons Learned from the Credit Lyonnais Trials
What are the common lessons to be learned from these three seemingly disparate
cases? Broadly speaking, the court in each case focused on process and documentation.
As discussed above, the existence of expanded fiduciary duties in the vicinity of
insolvency should cause directors to choose a course of action that best serves the entire
corporate enterprise rather than any single group. Process in this context thus can be
defined as evidence that the board of directors, officers or the company’s principals chose
an appropriate course of action, observed corporate formalities, passed resolutions after
due consideration and appeared to consider all available options before them. It is vital
that the process reflect that directors and officers acted on an informed basis,
demonstrated a heightened duty of inquiry and devoted more time and attention to the
corporation’s affairs than is traditionally required when a corporation is financially
healthy.
Of the three cases, Odyssey presents the best case for process. The Odyssey board
remained informed and engaged throughout the insolvency and foreclosure process.
They considered advice of counsel and established an adequate record that they weighed
various options and came to the conclusion that a bankruptcy filing would not be in the
best interests of the corporate entity as a whole. Schultz had some minimal level of
process (i.e., the board was requested to authorize the necessary papers for the sale
transaction), but the process proved wholly inadequate, given the systematic freeze-out of
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the outside directors. Moreover, it is well settled that directors who have substantial
stockholdings or who represent a major shareholder may be considered “interested” vis à
vis creditors when voting on transactions while the corporation is at or near insolvency.
Such directors may not be entitled to the benefit of the business judgment rule, and absent
approval by a majority of disinterested directors, may have to prove the entire fairness of
the transaction. Thus the Schultz family, instead of pushing through the transactions,
should have allowed the three outside directors to ratify the transaction, after supplying
them adequate documentation, in order to avoid having to show the fairness of the entire
transaction. The Schultz family, however, probably would have failed to meet this
evidentiary burden anyway, as the challenged transactions only benefited them. Finally,
Flutie presents perhaps the easiest case on process, because there was no apparent
process for the court to consider.
Adequate process alone, however, will not protect directors and officers facing a
Credit Lyonnais-type claim. That process must be well documented. It is particularly
important that directors or officers of struggling companies maintain adequate
documentation of their decision-making process, including the business and legal advice
they receive and rely upon to make their decisions. In Odyssey, although the
documentation of the bankruptcy option could have been stronger and clearer, the court
credited certain board minutes that dealt with the bankruptcy option and appeared to
credit testimony that the bankruptcy option was considered formally and informally by
the board. In Schultz, documentation was pivotal in the case against the Schultz family
directors. Failure to secure the fairness opinion was sufficient for Miramar to
successfully argue against Schultz’s § 523 discharge. (The underlying bankruptcy ruling
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also demonstrated numerous apparent shenanigans with both the board minutes and
subsequent SEC filings.) Again, Flutie is easy because the debtor’s principal was unable
to produce any documentation concerning transfer of the debtor’s funds (although the
documentation in Flutie dealt more with receipts and financial statements than with board
minutes or resolutions).
So, as a client might ask, what’s the real take-away from this? How do you distill
Odyssey, Schultz and Flutie into concrete, bottom line points to be used by directors and
officers who ultimately are on the front lines on this?
We sum the issues up in five bullet points:
•

Seek appropriate business and legal counsel that is tailored to the transaction or
events at issue.

•

Establish and maintain appropriate process and document it accurately every step of
the way. Full participation by outside directors is crucial.

•

Stay informed. Directors and officers need to devote more time and attention to a
corporation’s affairs than is required when a corporation is financially healthy.

•

Make sure the paper trail reflects acknowledgment of the corporation’s (and officers
and directors’) expanded duties in the zone of insolvency.

•

Choose courses of action that best serve the entire corporate enterprise rather than any
single group. Shareholders’ wishes should not be directors or officers’ only concern.
Finally, we realize that no discussion of the Credit Lyonnais vicinity of insolvency

claims is complete without acknowledging the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision last
year in Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc. Hailed by some as good
news for directors of Delaware corporations, Production Resources Group can be
interpreted to mean that Credit Lyonnais did not, in fact, create new fiduciary duties for
directors. Instead, what Credit Lyonnais really did, by requiring the consideration of the
interests of all corporate stakeholders, was to provide a “shield” to protect directors from
18

disgruntled shareholders claiming that the directors did not act in the shareholders’ best
interest. We will reserve our judgment on the ultimate effects of Production Resources
Group, but continue to believe that zone of insolvency claims will present very real
hazards to our corporate clients for the foreseeable future.
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